Chapter 60: Raid
At Yang Aiyuen's command, the entire Jin Army, following Yan Xishan's will, took action together.
In the early morning of March 1, 1940, the 33rd Army and the 50th Army under the command of Sun Chu took the lead in carrying out extensive attacks on the roads between Changzhi and Jincheng, Changzhi and Linfen, and Qinyuan and Qinxian. On that day, they destroyed about 136 kilometers of inter-county roads and 42 bridges along the line, carried out 17 blocking operations, destroyed 13 Japanese strongholds along the line, and killed, wounded, and captured 217 Japanese and puppet troops.
Following the actions of Sun Chu's troops, Fu Zuoyi in the northern section of Tongpu Railway and west of Taiyuan, Yang Chengyuan in the middle section of Tongpu Railway, Zhou Dai along the Zhengtai Railway, and Zhao Chengshou in the Hutuo River valley, the Shanxi East Anti-Japanese Corps behind enemy lines carried out extensive sabotage operations between Yangquan and Licheng.
As of March 7, China had reported the destruction of 1,108 kilometers of roads, 472 disruptions to the Tongpu and Zhengtai railways, killing, wounding, and capturing 2,014 Japanese and puppet troops, and seizing some weapons and military supplies.
It cannot be denied that these figures are definitely inflated. However, even a single destruction that caused 10 meters of damaged track or 100 meters of damaged road surface would have caused great obstacles to the Japanese army's transportation. In addition, the destruction of electric poles along the line led to the interruption of communication between the Japanese army's strongholds, which dealt a serious blow to the Japanese army, which was already in a state of panic.
Encouraged by the battle reports from Shanxi, on March 7, Hebei Provincial Chairman He Oucai issued an order to launch extensive sabotage warfare in western and southwestern Hebei. The Hebei People's Army, western Hebei Guerrilla Army, Liu Guiwu's Second Cavalry Division and other units successively launched road destruction campaigns, and the anti-Japanese armed forces behind enemy lines in central Hebei also responded. The Japanese troops in North China woke up to find themselves in a precarious situation.
On March 8, Pang Bingxun's troops of the 14th Corps, under the supervision of the Hebei-Henan War Zone, began to carry out raids on the Daoqing Road and the Handan to Xinxiang section of the Pinghan Road.
On the same day, Yu Xuezhong, commander-in-chief of the Jiangsu-Xuzhou-Shandong-Henan-Anhui War Zone, also formally issued an order, requiring the anti-Japanese armed forces behind enemy lines in Shandong to resolutely carry out sabotage operations on the Jiaoji Railway, the Shandong section of the Jinpu Railway and all major highways in the province.
The next day, Yang Hucheng, commander-in-chief of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui War Zone, also issued an order to "actively carry out sabotage operations and attack the Japanese army's transportation lines."
The 16th Corps, the 9th Army, the Reserve Cavalry Corps, the Henan Hui Muslim Anti-Enemy Corps, the Anhui Guerrilla Army behind enemy lines, the Anhui Central National Salvation Corps and other units of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui War Zone launched attacks one after another, launching uninterrupted strikes on the Henan Guide to Zhongmu section of the Longhai Railway, the Tongshan to Bengbu section of the Jinpu Railway, and the Xinzheng to Xinyang section of the Pinghan Railway.
The Seventh Army, the Twelfth Army Group, the Eleventh Corps and other units in the west of the road also participated in the battle while resting, and cooperated with the East China Army in the east of the road to cause great trouble to the Fifteenth Army of the Japanese Army in Henan.
On March 10, Zhou Chengrong, chairman of the Xu Hai Province, ordered Gao Guizi's 84th Division, Shen Ke's 127th Division, and Sun Dianying's New Fifth Army to carry out harassment and sabotage operations on the Xu Hai sections of the Longhai Road and the Jinpu Road. By then, the entire occupied area in North China had been mobilized, and a major war with the main target of attacking the Japanese army's transportation lines was underway.
Although Lieutenant General Yoshio Shinozuka, commander-in-chief of the Japanese First Army in Shanxi, had discovered through traitors and spy organizations throughout Shanxi that the Shanxi Army was planning a counterattack, he misjudged the strength and scope of the Chinese Army's counterattack. When he discovered that alarms were sounding on all sides, he was at a loss for what to do.
Also terrified were Lieutenant General Tada Shun, commander-in-chief of the North China Front Army, and Major General Kasahara Yukio, chief of staff. The Japanese troops in North China were already stretched thin, and now faced with war on all sides, they could only defend large and medium-sized cities and major strongholds on transportation lines. They simply could not spare enough troops to put out the enemy who was spreading across the prairie.
As a last resort, Lieutenant General Tada Shun and Major General Kasahara Yukio urgently requested guidance from the China Expeditionary Army Headquarters and the Kwantung Army in Nanjing, and at the same time tried every means to calculate the troop strength and squeeze out the troops that could be used to wipe out the Chinese army and the anti-Japanese armed forces behind enemy lines.
On March 14, the 9th Independent Mixed Brigade stationed in Xinxiang and the 1st Independent Mixed Brigade stationed in Handan began to jointly counterattack Pang Bingxun's troops.
On March 15, Lieutenant General Washizu Matsudaira, commander of the 21st Division of the Japanese Army stationed in Xuzhou, selected 17 infantry, artillery, engineering and logistics companies from his troops to form the Horijiro (Colonel Tomitaro) and Tachiko (Colonel Mutsukichi) detachments and began to carry out a mopping-up operation against the Chinese troops and local governments near Luomahu Lake and around Linyi.
On March 17, the 32nd Division stationed in Yanzhou also organized two detachments, Ijuin (Colonel Kanenobu) and Nagayu (Colonel Zehe), to carry out encirclement and suppression of the areas around Laiwu and the Yimeng Mountain area around Pingyi and Feixian.
On the same day, the Japanese Army's 5th Independent Mixed Brigade near Qingdao, the 6th Independent Mixed Brigade near Qingzhou, and the 10th Independent Mixed Brigade near Dezhou also successively selected several squadrons to form punitive teams to carry out a large-scale sweep of other anti-Japanese armed forces behind enemy lines in Shandong.
However, the North China Front Army's decision to withdraw troops stationed in Mongolia to the south was strongly resisted by Lieutenant General Naosaburo Okabe, commander of the troops stationed in Mongolia, and Chief of Staff Major General Shinichi Tanaka.
The Mongolian Army believed that the 26th Division and the Cavalry Group had not yet recovered after the Sui-Cha Campaign. At the same time, the Northwest Army might resume its offensive in Fengzhen and Zhangjiakou at any time. Under such circumstances, the Mongolian Army had no way to mobilize troops to the south to reinforce Shanxi and western Hebei.
However, the three divisions and four mixed brigades of the First Army stationed in Shanxi could not fully protect the transportation lines. The 15th Independent Mixed Brigade stationed in Pingxi alone could not wipe out the Chinese troops in western Hebei. Therefore, Major General Yukio Kasahara, who was suffering from gastroenteritis, flew to Zhangjiakou to try to persuade the troops stationed in Mongolia.
However, Lieutenant General Okabe and Major General Tanaka refused to give in. As a last resort, the exhausted Major General Kasahara used his authority as the commander-in-chief of the North China Front Army to force Lieutenant General Okabe to agree to transfer 14 infantry artillery squadrons from the 26th Division and the 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade, and 8 cavalry artillery squadrons from the cavalry group to reinforce the Hebei and Shanxi battlefields respectively.
On March 15, the commander-in-chief of the China Expeditionary Army decided that the 13th Army would be responsible for supporting the North China Front Army.
Lieutenant General Susumu Fujita, commander of the 13th Army, immediately decided to withdraw part of the forces of the 116th Division stationed in Anqing and Wuhu to launch a "besiege Wei to save Zhao"-style attack on Huoshan, Lu'an, Gushi, Shangcheng and other places. At the same time, he ordered the 13th Independent Mixed Brigade stationed in Luzhou to withdraw forces to carry out a mopping-up operation along the Jinpu Road south of Bengbu.
On March 16, the Kwantung Army Headquarters in Dalian passed a resolution to mobilize 20,000 puppet Manchukuo troops to reinforce North China, and the puppet Manchukuo troops in Jinzhou and other places immediately entered the pass.
Unfortunately, although there were active Communist anti-Japanese armed forces in Luandong area, no one obeyed the Hebei Provincial Government's order to destroy railways and highways, which resulted in six brigades of the puppet Manchukuo Army successfully joining the North China battlefield, bringing a devastating disaster to the anti-Japanese armed forces behind enemy lines in Hebei and other places.
On March 17, the 36th Division of the Japanese Army stationed in Changzhi and Jincheng finally put together 12 infantry, artillery and engineering squadrons to form two punitive teams to carry out a sweep of the Qinshui and Qinyuan lines and engaged in fierce fighting with Sun Chu's army along the Changqin Highway.
On March 17, the 41st Division stationed in Linfen also squeezed out more than 2,000 troops to launch an attack on Pu County, Daning and other places.
On March 18, the 37th Division of the Japanese Army stationed in Xinxian, Daixian, Fanshi and Lingqiu received reinforcements from the Mongolian Army and began to launch counterattacks against Zhao Chengshou's troops in Wutai and Fu Zuoyi's troops in Lanxian respectively.
The 9th Independent Mixed Brigade stationed near Taiyuan and the 16th Independent Mixed Brigade stationed near Fenyang also formed integrated battalions of thousands of people and attacked Zhongyang and Yushe respectively.
The Japanese Army's 4th Independent Mixed Brigade in Yangquan formed a punitive team with a small number of infantry, artillery and engineers to start sweeping the Chinese Army bases in Mengxian, Xiyang and other places.
Because China had formulated a tactic of avoiding the strong and attacking the weak before the war, it did not engage in fierce fire with the Japanese army, so the Japanese counterattack was soon effective. However, as the saying goes, "one problem is solved but another one arises", China did not engage in a head-on battle with the Japanese army, which was far more powerful than itself, but simply used its vast territory for maneuvering.
The Japanese troops, seemingly winning one victory after another, could only run around in a hurry, but the transportation lines they were trying to open up were still in a state of intestinal obstruction.
Despite the strategy of avoiding the strong and attacking the weak, China also suffered losses.
Under the pressure of the Japanese army, the anti-Japanese armed forces in the enemy rear in central Hebei, which were fighting alone, suffered brutal blows. A series of treason and surrender to the enemy also occurred in Shandong. The weak Xuhai provincial government had to take the lead in ordering the termination of the sabotage operations in the eastern section of the Longhai Road and along the Jinpu Road amid the complaints of Sun Dianying, Gao Guizi and others.
In view of the fact that the Japanese 12th Army, after dispersing the Chinese troops in Xu Hai, assembled all the mobile forces of two divisions and two independent mixed brigades to carry out a large-scale mopping-up operation in Shandong, the Jiangsu-Xuzhou-Shandong-Henan-Anhui War Zone, which was unable to continue, had to order on March 24 to stop the sabotage operations in Shandong and instead focus on dealing with the Japanese invasion.
Yu Xuezhong personally commanded Zhang Wenqing's unit of the 110th Division of the 49th Army and Liu Xiaotong of the 106th Division of the 7th Reserve Army in a fierce battle with the 32nd Division of the Japanese Army in the northeast of Yiyuan for two days, killing more than 700 Japanese and puppet troops and successfully covering the transfer of the Shandong Provincial Government.
On March 26, Yang Hucheng, worried about the loss of his strength, gave up the original plan of further raids on the pretext that the friendly forces on the west side of the road were not able to contain the enemy effectively and that the Japanese troops were showing a trend of encirclement on the three sides of Longhai Road, Pinghan Road and Jinpu Road. The entire army began to move.
Influenced by this, Shang Zhen, commander-in-chief of the Hebei-Henan War Zone, ordered Pang Bingxun's troops along the Daoqing Road to withdraw to their original defense zone.
After that, He Oucai ordered an end to the raids in western and southwestern Hebei on April 2, and the Shanxi-Chahar War Zone also ended the campaign on April 7. Thus, the transportation war in the entire North China that had lasted for more than a month came to an end.
According to the final reports from various places, 12,773 Japanese and puppet troops were killed, wounded or captured, and 2 artillery pieces and 1,127 machine guns of various types were seized. Although the results were not outstanding, it caused huge economic losses to the Japanese army.
On the other hand, it also demonstrated the strength of the anti-Japanese armed forces behind enemy lines, intimidated the Japanese army and the surrenderists, forced the Japanese army in Shanxi to temporarily abandon the implementation of the Southwest Shanxi Campaign, and forced the Japanese army in North China to turn to maintaining rule in the occupied areas, bringing a longer buffer period to the front battlefield.