Chapter 25: Operation Jin
The reason why the Japanese troops in Central China retreated to Anlu, Xiaochang and Xiaogan after rescuing the Sae and Mizuguchi detachments was because they had launched an attack on Nanchang since April 17.
In fact, as early as after the fall of Wuhan, Guiyang judged that the next target of the Japanese army would be Nanchang and Changsha.
However, as Chiang Kai-shek's direct troops were transferred to Yunnan for reorganization, the strength of the Ninth War Zone suddenly weakened. The war zone was unable to implement the Guiyang Military Commission's order to launch an attack in the direction of Nanxun controlled by the Japanese army to divert the enemy's attack direction and disrupt the Japanese army's offensive deployment. This gave the initiative to Okamura Yasuji.
On February 11, 1939, the 11th Army of Japan issued the battle guidance strategy of "Operation Ni", which was scheduled to start in mid-April, to capture Nanchang in one fell swoop and cut off and crush the Chinese troops along the Zhejiang-Jiangxi line.
For this purpose, Okamura Yasuji mobilized the 6th, 33rd, and 106th divisions.
On February 16, the Japanese Central China Expeditionary Army issued the "Outline for the Nanchang Operation" to the 11th Army based on the battle guidance strategy of "Operation Ni" reported by General Okamura Yasuji.
"The purpose of capturing Nanchang is to cut off the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Railway and the main line of communication between the enemy in Anhui Province and Zhejiang Province in the south of the Yangtze River. The 11th Army should break through the enemy's position with a sudden attack from the current state of confrontation, capture Nanchang along the Nanxun line in one fell swoop, and divide and crush the enemy along the Zhejiang-Jiangxi line. At the same time, a part of the army should advance from the Poyang Lake area to facilitate the main force to capture the vicinity of Nanchang, and then immediately secure the key line south of that area."
In order to interfere with China's judgment, the Japanese Central China Expeditionary Army also agreed on a joint combat plan with the Japanese China Fleet, and ordered the 16th Division in Hubei and the 22nd Division number of actions in the Han River and Qiantang River before the Nanchang operation began, in order to contain and confuse the Chinese army.
On February 19, the 11th Army agreed on a joint combat plan with the 3rd Flying Regiment directly under the Central China Expeditionary Army and the 2nd Joint Air Force of the Navy.
In order to ensure the success of the attack, Okamura Yasuji sent his chief of operations staff to fly several times during the preparation period to scout the terrain, the defenders' defense system, the condition of fortifications and troop deployment, the location of heavy weapons, etc., and based on this, he selected the river crossing (Xiu Shui) point, the route of advance, and the main direction of attack.
In order to increase the strength and speed of the attack, Okamura Yasuji changed the previous method of assigning field heavy artillery and tanks to various divisions for separate use. Instead, he concentrated the use of the artillery and tanks and unified their command when forcing the Xiushui River.
At the same time, the traditional tactics of distributing tanks in the front of infantry combat formations to cover and guide infantry attacks were changed. The tanks were organized into tank groups. At a distance of 2 days' journey ahead of the front-line troops, with the support of air forces, they carried out long-distance detours, broke through the defenders' defenses, and opened the way for the troops.
The artillery was commanded by the commander of the 6th Field Heavy Artillery Brigade, Ryoshiro Sumida, and had a total of more than 300 artillery pieces of various types.
The tanks were commanded by Hiroyoshi Ishii, commander of the 5th Tank Battalion, and there were a total of 135 tanks and armored vehicles.
In mid-March, the Japanese 33rd Division, the 106th Division and attached artillery began to gather in the area south of De'an, and the tank convoy gathered in the north of De'an.
In the second half of the month, the Sixth Division began to move towards Ruoxi and Wuning, the Chacun (Xiunan) Detachment began to open up the Poyang Lake waterway, and at the same time the Ninth Division also began to make feints in the northern section of the Yuehan Railway.
At this time, Guiyang was defending the northern front of Nanchang with Luo Zhuoying's 19th Army.
The 70th Army, the 49th Army, the 79th Army, the 32nd Army and the 9th Reserve Division were deployed in parallel from the east of Ruoxi River, the south bank of Xiushui River to the west bank of Poyang Lake.
The 72nd Army under Wang Lingji's 30th Army Group was responsible for defense in the Wuning area.
The 8th and 73rd Armies under Fan Songfu (the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Region Advance Army) were responsible for the defense near Henglu north of Wuning.
The 13th, 18th, 92nd, 37th and 52nd Armies of Tang Enbo's 31st Army Group were responsible for garrisoning southern Hubei and northern Hunan.
The 58th and the 74th Army directly under the war zone of Yu Jishi were ordered to control Changsha, Liuyang and Liling areas as reserve forces.
These troops may seem to have a large number, but their divisions have no more than 3,000 men and their armies only 10,000 men. Their guns and ammunition have been greatly lost in the continuous fighting, their artillery is very insufficient, and they have no tanks to help. Only in very rare cases will they receive support from the fighter planes of the Sino-Soviet flying squadrons that have been preserved with great difficulty. Therefore, it is difficult for them to compete with the relatively powerful Japanese army.
On April 13, the 116th Division directly under the Central China Expeditionary Army took the lead in sending two detachments led by Major General Ishihara and Colonel Murai, with the support of the navy. They set out by boat from Hubei to search the east bank of Poyang Lake to ensure water and land transportation and the safety of the left side of the main force. By the 15th, they encountered no resistance from the Chinese army, so they ended the search operation and deployed necessary troops at key points.
On the 18th, the Murai Detachment set out from Xingzi on a warship and landed near Wucheng, about 30 kilometers northeast of Yongxiu, and attacked the Chinese defenders, but was met with stubborn resistance from the 32nd Army and other units of the Chinese Army.
After four days of hard fighting, they still failed to break through the defenders' positions.
On the morning of the 23rd, the Japanese army continued to launch a fierce attack under the cover of aircraft and artillery fire, and continuously launched incendiary bombs and chemical bombs.
The defenders suffered heavy losses and withdrew from Wucheng Town on the 24th and moved backwards.
After the Murai Detachment occupied Wucheng, it continued to carry out operations to open up the Ganjiang River and Xiushui River and clear the mines laid by the Chinese side.
On April 15, the main forces of the Japanese 33rd and 106th Divisions and their artillery and tank convoys successively advanced to the north bank of Xiushui and occupied the starting areas of the attack.
After that, the artillery began test firing and fire reconnaissance.
At 16:30 on April 17, Okamura Yasuji ordered Major General Sumida Raishiro to command all artillery units to fire fiercely at the positions of the 49th and 79th Armies defending the south bank of Xiushui. This was a sudden artillery assault before the general offensive, which lasted for more than three hours and included a large number of poison gas bombs.
Many of the defenders' positions were destroyed, and many officers and soldiers including the commander of the 76th Division, Wang Lingyun, were poisoned.
At 19:30, the 106th Division began to force a crossing of Xiushui from Qiujin.
On the evening of the 20th, the 33rd Division also began to cross the river from north of Tujiabu.
Xiushui River is about 30 meters wide. Due to continuous rain, the river water rose by about 3 meters. Although it made it more difficult for the Japanese army to cross the river, many positions of the defenders were flooded and most of the water obstacles were washed away.
Two Japanese divisions broke through the front line of the defenders and launched continuous assaults at night. By dawn on the 18th, they occupied a beachhead with a depth of 2 kilometers and covered their engineers in building a pontoon bridge.
At around 8 o'clock, the Japanese tank group crossed the pontoon bridge and attacked the Dongshan defenders from the front of the 106th Division, and then detoured to Nanchang along the west side of Nanxun Road.
At 21:30 on the 20th, the Japanese vanguard tank group advanced to Fengxin and occupied the Laohe Bridge outside the South Gate.
The sudden attack of the tank group prevented the defending troops from withdrawing the 38 artillery pieces deployed on the outskirts of the city and they had to retreat in a hurry. The Japanese army then occupied Fengxin on the 21st.
After the Japanese tank group occupied Fengxin, they were running out of fuel and turned eastward after their planes dropped fuel. They continued to detour to the southwest of Nanchang and arrived at the Ganjiang Bridge west of Nanchang on the 23rd.
The 11th Army returned the reserve 147th Regiment to the 106th Division to strengthen the division's assault power.
The reinforced 106th Division occupied Anyi on the 24th. Its 111th Brigade attacked Gao'an to block the Chinese Ninth War Zone from reinforcing Nanchang. The main force turned eastward via Fengxin and defeated the 102nd Division reinforced by the Third War Zone west of Nanchang on the 25th. On the 26th, it advanced to Shengmi Street on the left bank of the Ganjiang River, crossed the Ganjiang River on the same day, bypassed Nanchang from the south, and cut off the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Railway.
The main force of the 33rd Division also passed through Wanbu and Huangxi, and reached Shengmi Street on the 26th. That night, it crossed the Ganjiang River and attacked Nanchang.
Its main force, the 33rd Infantry Regiment, traveled along the Nanxun Railway through Lehua and Jiaoqiao and arrived at the northern bank of the Ganjiang River northwest of Nanchang on the 26th.
After the 19th Army discovered that the Japanese army had bypassed Nanchang, it urgently ordered the 32nd Army to withdraw from Tujiaobu on the Nanxun Road to Nanchang and join the 102nd Division to defend Nanchang.
However, the 32nd Army had not yet withdrawn completely, while the Japanese tank group and the 101st Brigade had advanced to the Ganjiang Bridge west and north of Nanchang respectively .
Although the defenders blew up the bridges to block the enemy west and north of the Gan River, the 33rd Division of the Japanese Army had already broken into Nanchang from the south.
The defenders had few troops and weak firepower. After fierce street fighting, they suffered heavy casualties and were forced to retreat to Jinxian.
On the 27th, the 33rd Division of the Japanese Army occupied Nanchang.
On the 28th, in order to expand the results of the battle and ensure that there was enough buffer zone outside Nanchang, the 11th Army of the Japanese Army was ordered to use the 33rd Division to secure Nanchang and the main force of the 106th Division to reoccupy Fengxin, and prepare to fight towards Gao'an or west of Fengxin. In this way, on May 2, the Japanese army occupied Gao'an City.
After the Japanese army launched the general offensive, Bai Chongxi, director of the Guilin Headquarters of the Guiyang Government Military Commission, immediately ordered the troops of the Ninth War Zone to hold their positions.
On the 19th, Bai Chongxi ordered the commander-in-chief of the Third War Zone, Gu Zhutong, to quickly transfer the 102nd Division to Nanchang to strengthen the garrison of Nanchang and put it under the command of Luo Zhuoying, commander-in-chief of the 19th Army Group.
The 16th and 79th Divisions were also transferred to Dongxiang and Jinxian, southeast of Nanchang, to guard the south bank of Poyang Lake and support the operations in Nanchang. At the same time, the 19th Army was ordered to use a powerful force of about two divisions to attack key points such as Mahuiling, Ruichang, Jiujiang, and De'an in the enemy's rear, destroy railways and roads, cut off transportation in the enemy's rear, and prevent the enemy's follow-up reinforcements.
Bai Chongxi's use of maps to command from thousands of miles away was of course just talk. Due to poor communications, slow movements of troops, and poor coordination, his plan could not be implemented at all. At this time, the situation on the battlefield had changed.
At this time, Chiang Kai-shek had already realized that the Japanese army was determined to take Nanchang.
Fearing that too many casualties would be detrimental to future resistance, he sent a telegram to Xue Yue, commander-in-chief of the Ninth War Zone, Luo Zhuoying, commander-in-chief of the 19th Army Group, and Xiong Shihui, chairman of Jiangxi Province, on the evening of the 22nd: "This battle is not about the gains and losses of Nanchang, but about dealing the greatest blow to the enemy. Even if Nanchang falls, our armies should attack the designated targets regardless of everything, and decide on future combat plans based on this policy."
On April 24, Chiang Kai-shek again sent a telegram to Bai Chongxi, Xue Yue, Luo Zhuoying, and Gu Zhutong, instructing: "A. The main force of the Luo Group should focus on the Hunan-Jiangxi Highway, attack the enemy's right side, and press the enemy towards the Ganjiang River. Be careful not to fight with the main force behind the Ganjiang River. B. Defend the front of Nanchang with a necessary part. If necessary, resist successively between the Fuzhou and Ganjiang Rivers to protect southern Jiangxi."
